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ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that land-use regulations that fail to 
substantially advance legitimate state interests violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.  This standard seems readily applicable to rent control, a policy that has been 
shown to exacerbate the problems it is intended to remedy, and to impose heavy social costs that 
would not otherwise exist.  Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court has declared that it will 
not strike down rent control under the substantial advancement standard, nor will it apply a 
heightened level of scrutiny to such regulations.
In response to these rulings, California rental property owners have taken their 
constitutional claims to federal court.  In a series of decisions culminating in Cashman v. City of 
Cotati, the Ninth Circuit has found rent control laws to violate the Takings Clause under a 
substantial advancement standard.  One of these cases, Lingle v. Chevron, USA, was accepted for 
review by the United States Supreme Court in October, 2004.  The outcome of this case will 
have major ramifications for rent control and regulatory takings law in the 21st century.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.     The Once and Future Taking  1
II.   California Rental Property Owners Turn to 
the Federal Courts  6
III.  The Politics and Economics of Mobile Home Park
 Rent Control  9
IV.  The Capitalization of the Present Value of Rent 
Control into Coach Prices Has Been Empirically
Confirmed and Measured 12
V.    Early Takings Challenges to Mobile Home Park 
Rent Control Applied Loretto’s Physical Occupation
Analysis 16
VI.   Yee v. Escondido Marked a Transition from Hall’s
Physical Takings Theory to Claims Based on Failure
to Substantially Advance Legitimate Interests 19
VII.   The next Generation of Rent Control Takings Claims:
Richardson, Chevron, and Cashman 22
VIII.  Will the Supreme Court Finally Decide?  28
I
THE ONCE AND FUTURE TAKING
A decade ago I took part in a conference at Fordham University Law School, at 
which I set out the thesis that rent control, as commonly practiced in the United States, 
violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.1  The argument was 
straightforward, and has not changed.  Its core rests on the first prong of the Supreme 
Court’s two-part regulatory takings standard, first enunciated in Agins v. City of Tiburon,2
that a land-use regulation violates the Takings Clause if it fails to substantially advance 
legitimate state interests.3  I recognize that a handful of commentators have made 
something of a cottage industry out of arguing that the Court really didn’t mean what it 
said in Agins, or was confused, or somehow misstated the law, such that the substantial 
advancement test “really” isn’t a takings standard at all.4  To them I can only say, dream 
1 See R. S. Radford, Why Rent Control Is a Regulatory Taking, 6 Fordham Envt’l. L.J. 
755 (1995).  For an even earlier exposition of the same theme, see R. S. Radford, 
Regulatory Takings Law in the 1990s: The Death of Rent Control?, 21 Southw. U. L. 
Rev. 1019 (1992).  The Takings Clause provides, “. . . nor shall private property be taken 
for public use without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2
  447 U.S. 255 (1980).
3 Id. at 260.
4 See, e.g., Thomas E. Roberts,  Facial Takings Claims under Agins-Nectow: A 
2on.5  This doctrine is in fact firmly established, has regularly been reiterated,6 and has 
been employed to strike down a variety of land-use regulations, both facially and as 
Procedural Loose End, 24 U. Haw. L. Rev. 623, 639 (2002) (“The entry of the 
‘substantially advance legitimate state interests’ language into the takings lexicon can 
most charitably be described as a mistake”); Douglas T. Kendall, Timothy J. Dowling & 
Andrew W. Schwartz, TAKINGS LITIGATION HANDBOOK 237 (2000) (“Agins provides no 
evidence that the Court desired to create an entirely new standard of takings liability.”); 
John D. Echeverria, Does a Regulation That Fails to Advance a Legitimate Governmental 
Interest Result in a Regulatory Taking?, 29 Envtl. L. 853, 858 (1999) (attributing 
Supreme Court’s adoption of substantial advancement takings test to “an inadvertent 
muddling of legal doctrines”).
5
  For a more nuanced response, see R. S. Radford, Of Course a Land Use Regulation 
That Fails to Substantially Advance Legitimate State Interests Results in a Regulatory 
Taking, 15 Fordham Envt’l L. J. 353 (2004).
6 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 
302, 334 (2002); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 704 
(1999), Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 
534 (1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); United States v. 
Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985).
3applied.7  Indeed, the Court went far out of its way to reaffirm the substantial 
advancement test as a viable regulatory takings standard in the last major takings case to 
come before it, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.8
Until the Court says or does something that can reasonably be construed as repudiating 
the substantial advancement takings standard, I will therefore assume that it remains in 
effect.
Complying with this criterion requires that restrictive regulations be designed to 
mitigate some demonstrable social costs that would otherwise be imposed by the 
7 See City of Monterey, id.; Dolan, id.; Nollan,  id.
8
  535 U.S. 302 (2002).  Although the Tahoe-Sierra Court found that a temporary 
development moratorium could not effect a categorical taking under Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion went on to 
explain that such a moratorium could give rise to liability as a regulatory taking under 
any of seven alternative theories, including the following:
[A]part from the District Court’s finding that TRPA’s actions represented a 
proportional response to a serious risk of harm to the lake, petitioners might have 
argued that the moratoria did not substantially advance a legitimate state 
interest. 
Id. at 334 (emphasis added).
4unregulated use of the property in question.9  Already in 1995 there existed a mass of 
uncontroverted empirical evidence demonstrating that rent control tends to have the 
opposite effect – creating social costs and burdens that would not otherwise exist, and 
exacerbating housing problems far beyond anything that would pertain in competitive 
markets.  Rent-controlled cities in California and Massachusetts have suffered serious 
declines in their stock of rental housing, despite a housing boom in comparable but 
uncontrolled cities in those states.10  Moreover, the incidence of these costs has been 
alarmingly regressive.  It has long been understood that a disproportionate share of the 
financial benefits of rent control accrue to residents of the most well-to-do 
neighborhoods.11  In California, this tendency has been pushed to new heights (or depths, 
9
  See Nollan., 483 U.S. at 838-39.  See also, e.g., Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: 
Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 591, 602 (1998):
[The Nollan] Court described the “substantially advance” test as one that 
examines the proportionate relationship between the amount of public harm 
caused by the owner and the regulatory burden imposed: a cause-effect test.
10 See Radford, Why Rent Control Is a Regulatory Taking, supra note 1, at 770 (citing 
research showing that, “[w]hile the regulated cities lost 8% to 14% of their rental housing 
stock, comparable locales without rent control increased their supply of rental units, 
typically by 5% to 20% over the decade.”) (emphasis in original).
11 See, e.g., John C. Moorhouse, Long-Term Rent Control and Tenant Subsidies, 27 Q. 
5depending on one’s social perspective), as the diminishing rental housing stock has 
become occupied by an increasingly white, middle class, professional population of 
renters.12  It is hard to imagine another policy option that could have been more effective 
in displacing the poor and minorities from such bastions of radical gentrification as 
Berkeley and Santa Monica, California.13
One thing that has changed in the course of the past ten years, however, is that the 
California Supreme Court has made it unmistakably clear that it just doesn’t care.  In
Santa Monica Beach Ltd. v. Superior Court,14 a regulatory taking challenge to Santa 
Monica’s rent control scheme, the state’s high court proclaimed that, contrary to the 
United State Supreme Court’s requirement of heightened scrutiny in such cases,15 it 
would apply the most deferential possible standard of review.  If a human being can be 
located, anywhere on the face of the earth, who can imagine any possible rationale for 
Rev. Econ. & Bus. 6, 21 (1987); Ned Levine, et al., Who Benefits from Rent Control?, 56 
Am. Plan. Ass’n. J. 140, 144 (1990).
12 See St. John & Associates, Rent Control in Perspective: Impacts on Citizens and 
Housing in Berkeley and Santa Monica Twelve Years Later (August, 1993).
13 See id.
14
  968 P.2d 993 (Cal. 1999).
15 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3.
6adopting such a law, it will pass constitutional muster in California.16  And just to be on 
the safe side, the state court added (in a separate decision) that the constitutionally 
required remedy of just compensation would not be available, even if a violation of the 
Takings Clause were somehow established.  Under the doctrine laid down in Kavanau v. 
Santa Monica Rent Control Board,17 the only remedy California courts can grant for 
being deprived of one’s property by a predatory rent control board is the right to ask them 
to please give it back.18  Certainly, being required to return to an agency that has violated 
your constitutional rights and ask them to reconsider seems more like a remedy for a due 
process violation than for a taking.  The California Supreme Court agrees but is not 
bothered by that fact, since it has determined that “a remedy for [a] due process violation, 
if available and adequate, obviates a finding of a taking.”19  Because every takings 
claimant was already required, under California’s unique procedural scheme, to obtain a 
16 See Santa Monica Beach, 968 P.2d at 1002.
17
  941 P.2d 851 (Cal. 1997).
18
  The Kavanau court established that the only recourse for property owners who have 
been subjected to confiscatory rent regulations is to seek to have the rent board’s actions 
invalidated via mandamus, followed by a return to the offending agency for further 
proceedings.  See id. at 865.
19 Id. at 865 (emphasis added).
7due process remedy as a prerequisite to pursuing inverse condemnation,20 and under 
Kavanau a due process remedy obviates the finding of a taking (and therefore moots any 
inverse condemnation claim), the California Supreme Court has effectively foreclosed 
inverse condemnation as a remedy in all cases alleging a regulatory taking by operation 
of a rent control law.21
It remains true today, as it was a decade ago, that the United States Supreme 
Court has never upheld a peacetime rent control law challenged as a regulatory taking,22
and in fact struck down one such measure in the formative years of its regulatory takings 
jurisprudence.23  Elsewhere at the state level, New York’s highest tribunal has found a 
rent control law to be unconstitutional under the substantial advancement inquiry.24  In 
California, however, rental property owners have learned that they will have to look 
elsewhere than to the state court system to pursue legal claims stemming from violations 
20 See Hensler v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043, 1056-60 (Cal. 1994) (holding that all 
regulatory takings claims in California courts must proceed by way of administrative 
mandamus or declaratory relief).
21 See, e.g., Galland v. City of Clovis, 16 P.3d 130, 134 (Cal. 2001) (Kavanau
“precluded a claim for inverse condemnation”).
22 See Radford, Why Rent Control Is a Regulatory Taking, supra note 1, at 762-64.
23
  See Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547-48 (1924).
24 See Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hospital, 643 N.E. 2d 479, 483-84 (N.Y. 1994).
8of their Fifth Amendment rights.
II
CALIFORNIA RENTAL PROPERTY
OWNERS TURN TO THE FEDERAL COURTS
Following the Kavanau and Santa Monica Beach decisions, California property 
owners began turning to the federal judiciary, which might reasonably be presumed to 
offer a more stalwart defense of rights guaranteed under the federal Constitution.  Indeed, 
a takings challenge to a mobile home park rent control law had already met with success 
in the Ninth Circuit,25 albeit under a somewhat strained legal theory.26  Nevertheless, the 
shift from state to federal court as the preferred locus of rent control litigation has not 
been a seamless transition.  A host of procedural pitfalls have presented themselves, 
many of which are still being litigated at this time.27
In the Ninth Circuit, regulatory takings claims must be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 
25 See Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 797 F.2d 1493, amended on denial of rehearing and 
rehearing en banc, 833 F.2 1270 (9th Cir. 1986).
26 See infra, text at notes 74-83.
27 See, e.g., Carson Harbor Village, Ltd., v. City of Carson, 353 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(petition for certiorari pending); Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan Hill, 
353 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San 
Francisco, 364 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2004) (same).
91983,28 and the Supreme Court has tied the statute of limitations for § 1983 actions to the 
applicable state’s statute for personal injury claims.29  At the time of Kavanau and Santa 
Monica Beach, this set a one-year limitation period for bringing takings claims in federal 
court.30  No new apartment rent control ordinances have been adopted in California since 
the 1980s, so facial takings challenges to these measures cannot be brought in federal 
court unless they are significantly amended.  On the other hand, scores of California 
jurisdictions have imposed rent control on mobile home parks over the past decade, and 
these laws continue to be adopted throughout the state.  For this reason, all facial takings 
challenges to rent control laws filed in the federal courts of California since Kavanau and 
Santa Monica Beach have been brought by the owners of mobile home parks.
A far more serious stumbling block has been the “ripeness” doctrine of 
Richardson limited land-rent increases and specifically provided that the below-market 
28 See Azul-Pacifico, Inc., v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992).
29 See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
30
  The California statute of limitations was increased to two years in 2002.  See Calif. 
Code Civ. Proc. § 335.1.
31
  473 U.S. 172 (1985).
32 Id. at 194.
33
  473 U.S. at 194.
10
34 See, e.g., Carson Harbor Village, 353 F.3d at 829-30; Hacienda Valley Mobile 
Estates, 353 F.3d at 659-60.
35
  Sinclair Oil Corp. v. County of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401, 406 (9th Cir. 1996), 
quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. at 534.  See also San Remo Hotel v. City and 
County of San Francisco, 145 F.3d 1095, 1102 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that a facial 
takings claim based solely on the allegation that an ordinance did not substantially 
advance legitimate interests is immediately ripe for federal adjudication).
36 See, e.g.,  Montclair Parkowners Association v. City of Montclair, 264 F.3d 829 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (district court invoked Younger abstention to avoid exercising jurisdiction over 
mobile home rent control takings claim); San Remo Hotel v. City and county of San 
Francisco, 364 F.3d 1088 (district court invoked claim and issue preclusion after state 
claims had been litigated in state court in compliance with Williamson County).
37 See, e.g., ARMEN ALCHIAN & WILLIAM R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION 93-96 
(2d ed. 1977); ANTHONY DOWNS, RESIDENTIAL RENT CONTROLS: AN EVALUATION 55-60 
(1988).
38 See generally, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965); 
Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 Amer. Econ. 
Rev. 291 (1974).
11
39
  See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 778 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(cautioning against the influence of “factions,” i.e,,  “a number of citizens, whether 
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some 
common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community”).
40
  John O. McGinnis, Public Choice and the Structural Constitution: the Original 
Constitution and its Decline: a Public Choice Perspective, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 
195, 197 (1997).
41 See, e.g. Richard A. Epstein, Yee v. City of Escondido: The Supreme Court Strikes Out 
Again, 26 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 3, 10 (1992) (Mobile home park rent 
control “ increases the returns to local renters from the passage of the rent control statute
by allowing them to capture the full stream of future periodic expropriations from the 
landlord.  That larger rate of return gives the renters a greater inducement for the passage 
of the rent control statute in the first place, and thus increases the likelihood that such a 
statute will be passed.”).
42
  It should go without saying that this is a market process that will occur even if coach 
owners themselves are incapable of estimating the variables.
43 See, e.g., Werner Z. Hirsch & Joel C. Hirsch, Legal-Economic Analysis of Rent 
Controls in a Mobile Home Context: Placement Values and Vacancy Decontrol, 35 
UCLA L. Rev. 399, 423-24 (1988).
12
44
  Despite a superficial similarity, rent control’s inverse impact on the prices of coaches 
and pads does not imply that these are complementary goods (like popcorn and popcorn 
poppers, in the colorful but economically uninformed analysis of the California Court of 
Appeal in Yee v. City of Escondido, 224 Cal.App.3d 1349 (1990).
45
  This is the Golden State Mobilehome Owners League (GSMOL).  For an account of 
GSMOL’s leading role in California rent control politics, see William A. Fischel, 
Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why Is More Efficient Regulation a Taking of 
Property?, 67 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 865, 895-97 (1991).  In recent years a second, smaller 
lobbying group has split off from GSMOL and conducts parallel lobbying activities.
46
  Cal. Gov. Code §§ 798 et seq.
47 See id., §§ 798.70 - 798.73.
48 See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 43, at 420-22.
49 See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the 
Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 Columb. L. Rev. 473 (1991).  As Fischel 
observes, “‘[e]xit’ has a hollow meaning for people with immovable assets.”  Fischel, 
supra note 45, at 898.
50 See, e.g., DOWNS, supra note 37, at17-28; Richard W. Ault, et al., The Effect of Long -
term Rent Control on Tenant Mobility, 35 J. Urb. Econ. 140 (1994); Steven B. Caudill, et 
al., Efficient Estimation of the Costs of Rent Controls, 71 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 154 (1989); 
13
Donald F. Vitaliano, Measuring the Efficiency Cost of Rent Control, 14 Am. Real Est. & 
Urb. Econ. Ass’n J. 61 (1986).
51
  A professor of economics and consultant to the RAND Corporation, Dr. Hirsch is the 
author of college textbooks in, inter alia, statistics and economic analysis of law.  See
“Vitae: Werner Z. Hirsch,” dated October, 1999, on file with author.
52
  Werner Z. Hirsch, An Inquiry into Effects of Mobile Home Park Rent Control, 24 J. 
Urb. Econ. 212 (1988).  This same study formed the basis for a second article appearing 
in 1988, this one co-authored with attorney Joel C. Hirsch and published in the UCLA 
Law Review.  See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra, note 43.
53 See Werner Z. Hirsch, An Inquiry into Effects of Mobile Home Park Rent Control, id., 
at 223.
54 See id. at 220.
55 See id.
56 Id. at 223-24.
57 Id. at 224.
58 See Werner Z. Hirsch & Anthony M. Rufolo, The Regulation of Immobile Housing 
Assets under Divided Ownership, 19 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 383, 395 (1999).
59 See id.
14
60 Id. at 396.
61 See John M. Quigley, Economic Analysis of Mobile Home Rent Control: The Example 
of San Rafael, California (September 12, 2002) (unpublished report on file with author).
62 See id. at 15-16.
63 See id.
64 See id. at 17.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See id. at 23.
68 Id. at 2.
69 See David Dale-Johnson, et al., An Examination of the Impact of Rent Control on 
Mobile Home Prices in California (draft final report dated October 11, 2004, on file with 
author).
70 See id. at 15.
71
   458 U.S. 419 (1982).  In Loretto, the Court established that “a permanent physical 
occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests 
that it may serve.”  Id. at 426.
15
72
  833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986).
73 Id. at 1273.
74 Id. at 1273-74.
75 See id. at 1275-76.
76 Id. at 1276.
77 See id at 1280-81.
78 Id. at 1281.
79 Id. at 1280-81.
80 See id.
81 Id. at 1283.
82 Id. (citation omitted).
83 Id.
84 See, e.g., DeAnza Properties X, Ltd., v. County of Santa Cruz, 936 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 
1992); Azul-Pacifico, Inc., v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704.
85
  At the time Hall was filed, the California Supreme Court expressly foreclosed just 
compensation as a remedy for regulatory takings.  In 1987, the United States Supreme 
16
Court repudiated this doctrine in First English, and the federal judiciary has since then 
adhered to the somewhat naive belief that California would follow the High Court’s 
mandate.  As noted above, it has not.  See supra, text at notes 14-24.
86
  503 U.S. 519.
87
  For a critique of some of the flaws in Justice Wiener’s opinion for the Fourth District 
Court of Appeal, see Fischel, supra note 45, at 903-906.
88
  503 U.S. at 527.
89 Id. at 530.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 526-30.
92 Id. at 530, citing to Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35.
93 See Hall, 833 F.2 at 1280-81.
94
  See Yee v. City of Escondido, No. 90-1947, Brief for Petitioners, Nov. 27, 1991, at 25-
30 (arguing that Escondido’s mobile home rent control ordinance failed to substantially 
advance legitimate state interests under Agins).
95 See Yee v. City of Escondido, No. 90-1947, Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal 
Foundation in Support of Petitioners.
17
rents were transferable, thereby facilitating capitalization of the financial benefits of rent 
control by condominium residents.101  As in the analogous case of mobile home parks, 
the Ninth Circuit recognized that “[i]ncumbent owner occupants who sell to those who 
96
  503 U.S. at 533.
97
  Judge Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot about Legal Scholarship?, 37 Hous. L. Rev. 
295, 303 (2000).
98 See, e.g., Kari Anne Gallagher, Comment, Will Mobile Homes Provide an Open Road 
for the Nollan  Analysis?, 67 Notre Dame L. Rev. 821, 848 (1992) (“Evaluated according 
to the [Agins] analysis, the Escondido ordinance works a taking of private property 
without just compensation.  The Escondido ordinance does not substantially advance 
legitimate state interests, and it requires mobile home park owners to bear the burden of 
curing a social problem that they did not create.  Therefore, the ordinance, evaluated 
under [Agins], violates the Fifth Amendment.”); Dwight C. Hirsh IV, Casenote, Yee v. 
City of Escondido--A Rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s Unique Physical Takings Theory 
Opens the Gates for Mobile Home Park Owners’ Regulatory Takings Claims, 24 Pac. 
L.J. 1681, 1725 (1993).
99
  124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1997).
100 See id. at 1163.
101 Id. at 1163-64.
18
intend to occupy the apartment will charge a premium for the benefit of living in a rent 
controlled condominium”102 Drawing on Yee, the court of appeals went on to note that 
this feature of the ordinance prevented it from substantially advancing legitimate 
governmental interests:
The conveyance provision, as explained above [facilitating the 
capitalization and capture of the monetary benefits of rent control], vitiates 
the cause-and-effect relationship between the property use restricted (rent 
102 Id.  In striking down the Honolulu ordinance on summary judgment, the Federal 
District Court in Richardson made the resemblance to mobile home park rent control 
even more explicit:
Like mobile home park tenants, owner-occupants of leasehold 
condominiums own their housing unit . . . but lease the underlying land.  
Moreover, the below-market rate lease rent which applies to the mobile 
home tenants and leasehold condominium owner-occupants is transferable 
to a subsequent purchaser of the mobile home pad or condominium.  With 
respect to both mobile homes and condominiums, the availability of a 
below-market rate lease rent necessarily increases the value of the subject 
housing unit, thereby allowing a seller to command a premium upon the 
sale of the housing unit.
Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 802 F. Supp. 326, 338 (D. Haw. 1992) 
(emphasis added).
19
rates) and the social evil the Ordinance seeks to remedy (lack of affordable 
housing).103
The same analysis was subsequently applied in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Cayetano 
(Chevron I),104 a case in which Chevron alleged that restrictions on the rent it could 
charge lessee dealers of retail service stations violated the Takings Clause.  The District 
Court agreed with Chevron that the regulations enabled incumbent dealers to capitalize 
the monetary value of reduced rents by selling their dealerships.105  The court explained:
[t]he existence of the rent cap makes an independent dealer’s leasehold 
interest in a service station more valuable, and this added value becomes 
especially significant when an incumbent dealer undertakes to sell his 
interest.  . . .  Since the Act does not prohibit an incumbent dealer from 
selling his or her service station lease, the rent cap provision enables these 
dealers to sell their stations at a premium.106
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that summary judgment had been improperly 
granted because of the existence of conflicting expert testimony on whether the premium 
created by the regulations could be capitalized and captured by the dealers, or whether 
Chevron could offset this effect by adjusting the wholesale price of its gasoline.107  At 
this point the factual dispute in Chevron diverges from the mobile home park paradigm, 
103 Id. at 1165.
104
  224 F.3d 1030 (9th  Cir. 2000).
105 See Chevron v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1010 (D. Haw. 1998).
106 Id.
107 See 224 F.3d at 1037-1040.
20
since in the latter case there is no possibility of a secondary, offsetting revenue flow 
between owners and tenants.  Nevertheless, Chevron I is important because of its strong 
reaffirmation of the appropriateness of the substantial advancement standard in takings 
claims of this kind,108 and its acknowledgment that reviewing courts must examine the 
actual effects of such laws under a heightened level of scrutiny, rather than deferring to 
statements of legitimate legislative intent.109
On remand, the District Court again found that Hawaii’s service station rent 
control scheme violated the Takings Clause.110  Twelve years to the day after Yee was 
decided, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in Chevron v. Lingle (Chevron II),111 once again 
applying the substantial advancement standard to find the rent statute unconstitutional on 
108 See id. at 1034-37.  “In sum, we disagree with the concurrence’s position that we 
should apply the ‘reasonableness’ test to evaluate Chevron’s regulatory takings claim.  
The correct test is ‘whether the legislation substantially advances a legitimate state 
interest,’ as discussed above, as suggested by the Supreme Court in Yee, as used by the 
district court in this case, and as established by this court in Richardson.”  Id. at 1037.
109 See id. at 1033-34 (rejecting the State of Hawaii’s argument that “courts should look 
only to whether ‘the Legislature rationally could have believed the Act would 
substantially advance a legitimate government purpose.’”).
110 See Chevron v. Cayetano. 198 F. Supp.2d 1182 (D. Haw. 2002).
111
  363 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2004).
21
its face.112  Covering much the same ground it had in Chevron I, the court of appeals 
again drew on Yee and Richardson as teaching 
“that application of the ‘substantially advances’ test is appropriate where a rent 
control ordinance creates the possibility that an incumbent lessee will be able to 
capture the value of the decreased rent in the form of a premium.”113
The panel carefully considered and rejected a panoply of new arguments the state leveled 
against the use of this analysis,114 and rebuffed the government’s plea for deferential 
review by noting that this option had been “specifically reject[ed]” by the Supreme Court 
in Nollan.115
Together, the two Chevron decisions and Richardson firmly established that rent 
control ordinances that enable tenants to capitalize the cash value of the regulations into 
the resale price of an asset will be closely evaluated under the substantial advancement 
standard in the Ninth Circuit.  This set the stage for the first regulatory takings challenge 
to mobile home park rent control to be decided on the merits in federal court.
In 1997, the California Court of Appeal had reversed the dismissal of a takings 
claim against the City of Cotati’s general rent control law, setting the stage for a trial on 
112 See id. at 857-58.
113 Id. at 849.
114 Id. at 850-53.
115 Id. at 854 (citing Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825 n.3).
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the merits.116  Instead of proceeding to trial, the city agreed to settle the lawsuit 
contingent upon an unqualified repeal of the ordinance by the city’s voters.  But no 
sooner had the electorate voted to remove rent control from the books, than the city 
council adopted a new measure that applied rent control exclusively to mobile home 
parks.  The city’s three park owners,117 feeling that they had unfairly been singled out by 
the new law, filed suit under a Richardson-style substantial advancement takings theory.  
This case, Cashman v. City of Cotati,118 reached the Ninth Circuit in 2004.
In a decision that closely tracks the legal analysis of Richardson and the two 
Chevron decisions, the Cashman panel reversed a trial court’s ruling that Cotati’s new 
rent ordinance passed constitutional muster, and held that an earlier order granting 
summary judgment to the park owners should be reinstated.119  The panel noted the 
case’s factual similarity to Richardson, which was also decided on summary judgment:
Like in Richardson, there is no dispute that Ordinance No. 680 does not on its 
face prevent mobilehome tenants from capturing a premium.  There is separate 
116 See 152 Valparaiso Associates v. City of Cotati, 56 Cal.App.4th 378 (1997).
117
  One of the original three plaintiffs, Elizabeth White, sold her park and withdrew as a 
party to the litigation after the city filed a retaliatory lawsuit against the plaintiffs in state 
court.  See City of Cotati v. Cashman, 52 P.3d 695 (Cal. 2002) (carving out an exception 
from California’s anti-SLAPP statute for municipalities filing such retaliatory litigation).
118
  374 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2004).
119 See id. at 899.
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ownership of the mobilehome coaches and the underlying land, controlled rent, 
and the ability of incumbent tenants to sell their mobilehomes subject to this 
controlled rent.  This creates the possibility of a premium, which undermines the 
City's interest in creating or maintaining affordable housing.120
In contrast, the Cashman court pointed to the absence of extraneous variables such as had 
been present in Chevron, that could potentially prevent Cotati’s tenants from capitalizing 
and capturing the rent control premium.121  It is perhaps noteworthy that the relatively 
brief majority opinion in Cashman did not find it necessary to present a detailed rationale 
for its application of the substantial advancement standard and heightened scrutiny.  
Presumably, after Chevron II, the propriety of that approach in such cases can be 
considered settled law of the circuit.
On August 3, 2004, the City of Cotati filed a petition with the Ninth Circuit 
seeking rehearing or rehearing en banc, once again urging rejection of the substantial 
advancement standard and heightened scrutiny of regulatory takings claims.122  Although 
the city’s petition remains pending at this writing, it seems unlikely that a majority of 
Ninth Circuit judges would be eager to reverse an unambiguous line of circuit precedent 
stretching back to Richardson – especially given the absence of any inter-circuit conflict, 
and the firm grounding of Richardson, Chevron I, Chevron II, and Cashman in a quarter 
120 Id.
121 Id. at 898-99.
122 See Cashman v. City of Cotati, No. 03-15066, Petition for Panel Rehearing and 
Rehearing En Banc, dated August 3, 2004.
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century of Supreme Court precedent.
The simple reality of the matter may be the Ninth Circuit has finally arrived at a 
state I thought had been reached ten years ago:123 the understanding that, under a proper 
application of Agins’ substantial advancement standard and heightened scrutiny, rent 
control is a regulatory taking.
VIII
WILL THE SUPREME COURT FINALLY DECIDE?
After denying petitions in a long series of rent control cases dating back to its 
decision in Yee, the Supreme Court in October, 2004, granted certiorari in Chevron II
(now denominated Lingle v. Chevron).124  The State of Hawaii’s petition focused on the 
Ninth Circuit’s application of the substantial advancement test and heightened scrutiny, 
in effect asking the High Court to revisit an entire line of its regulatory takings 
jurisprudence, stretching back a quarter century through Nollan, to Agins.  Finally, by the 
summer of 2005, the Supreme Court may clarify the nature of the invitation it held out in 
Yee: Does the Takings Clause still function as a bulwark of individual sovereignty against 
majoritarian rent-seeking?  Or will the Court follow California in adopting an “anything 
goes” standard of review?  In the realm of judicial review of land-use regulation, Lingle 
v. Chevron may well set the direction for the 21st century.
123 See Radford, Why Rent Control Is a Regulatory Taking, supra note 1.
124
  Case No. 04-163, October 12, 2004.
